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Type 2 blindsightUnlike those with type 1 blindsight, people who have type 2 blindsight have some sort of
consciousness of the stimuli in their blind ﬁeld. What is the nature of that consciousness?
Is it visual experience? I address these questions by considering whether we can establish
the existence of any structural—necessary—features of visual experience. I argue that it is
very difﬁcult to establish the existence of any such features. In particular, I investigate
whether it is possible to visually, or more generally perceptually, experience form or move-
ment at a distance from our body, without experiencing colour. The traditional answer,
advocated by Aristotle, and some other philosophers, up to and including the present
day, is that it is not and hence colour is a structural feature of visual experience. I argue
that there is no good reason to think that this is impossible, and provide evidence from four
cases—sensory substitution, achomatopsia, phantom contours and amodal completion—in
favour of the idea that it is possible. If it is possible then one important reason for rejecting
the idea that people with type 2 blindsight do not have visual experiences is undermined. I
suggest further experiments that could be done to help settle the matter.
 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).0. Introduction
Unlike those with type 1 blindsight, people who have type 2 blindsight have some sort of consciousness of the stimuli in
their blind ﬁeld. What is the nature of that consciousness? More speciﬁcally, do those people have a visual experience of a
stimulus or of some of its features, or do they lack such a visual experience, and have some other type of conscious state, such
as a conscious feeling or thought? I address this question by considering whether we can establish the existence of any struc-
tural features of visual experience. Structural features of experience are necessary features of experience. I will argue that it
is very difﬁcult to establish the existence of any such features. In particular, I investigate whether it is possible to visually, or
more generally perceptually, experience form or movement at a distance from our body, without experiencing some colour
(chromatic or achromatic colour). The traditional answer, advocated by Aristotle, and some other philosophers, up to and
including the present day, is that it is not. I argue that there is no good reason to think that this is impossible, and the evi-
dence, although not conclusive, suggests that it is possible. If this is possible then one important reason for rejecting the idea
that people with type 2 blindsight do not have visual experiences is undermined.
This result is important for if it can be established that those who have type 2 blindsight are having visual experiences
then we have reason to think that area V1 of the visual cortex is not required for visual consciousness. This is because such
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there is some evidence to suggest that in fact type 1 blindsight does not exist at all, and that all cases of blindsight are really
of type 2 (Overgaard, Fehl, Mouridsen, Bergholt, & Cleeremans, 2008). If that is right then one main source of evidence for think-
ing that there can be unconscious perception is removed.
In section one, I explicate what structural features of experience are. In section two, I outline the nature of type 1 and type
2 blindsight. In particular, I outline the debate about the nature of the conscious state in those said to have type 2 blindsight.
In section three, I discuss the difference between different kinds of mental states and argue that those with type 2 blindsight
either have visual experiences or conscious thoughts. We should eschew the idea that their awareness or consciousness is a
matter of them having feelings. In section four, I examine the evidence about the nature of the awareness or consciousness
had in type 2 blindsight. I show that one reason given by Overgaard et al. (2008) and Overgaard and Grünbaum (2011) for
thinking that those with type 2 blindsight have visual experiences is not a good one. I then go on to explicate two arguments
that Brogaard (2011, 2012) has put forward in favour of thinking that the sort of consciousness in type 2 blindsight is con-
scious thought. I show that one of these arguments is not suitably backed up by the empirical evidence. So the weight of her
position rests on the other argument. That argument relies on the premise that visual experiences have a certain structural
feature: they must all be experiences of colour. In section ﬁve, I explore whether one should believe that visual experiences
must have that feature and conclude that there is no good reason to think that. Indeed, the evidence tells in favour, although
not conclusively, of the claim that they do not. That evidence also points towards an account of what the visual experiences
of those with type 2 blindsight might be like that has not yet been considered. I show that visual experiences can be like that.
I therefore conclude that there are no good arguments for the conclusion that the type of consciousness enjoyed by people
with type 2 blindsight cannot be visual experience. And I suggest further experiments that could be done to test whether
they do have such experiences.
1. Structural features of perceptual experience
What are structural features of perceptual experience? Structural features of experience are invariant features of experi-
ence. On a weak understanding, they are simply invariant features of human perceptual experience that exist as a matter of
nomological necessity given the kind of human brain that we have. Thus, the perceptual experiences of creatures that have
other types of brain need not exhibit these invariant features, nor need the perceptual experiences of subjects with human
brains in possible worlds with a physics unlike our own. On a strong understanding, structural features of perceptual expe-
rience are metaphysically or conceptually necessary invariant features of experience tout court. Such features would be true
of any creature with any type of brain in every possible world. Of course, there will be accounts of structural features of expe-
rience of strengths intermediate to the strong and the weak kinds just outlined: metaphysically necessary features true of all
subjects with humans brains, and nomologically necessary features true of all creatures no matter what kind of brain they
have. However, I set these aside in this paper.
Here are some examples of propositions that some people have claimed specify structural features of perceptual experi-
ence. I offer these up only as candidates for propositions that specify structural features. I do not show that they really are
ones.2 I begin with an example that many hold to be true:
(i) Necessarily, perceptual experiences are conscious.
This is plausibly proposition that speciﬁes a structural feature of perceptual experience—and a structural feature of per-
ceptual experience in the strong sense. Many philosophers hold this to be true a priori.
Many candidate structural features of perceptual experience will be features concerning what is represented in percep-
tual experience. Some may be pertain to all experiences. For example this proposition speciﬁes an alleged such feature:
(ii) Necessarily, perceptual experiences represent space and time.
The representation of space and time is, somewhat plausibly, a weak structural feature of perceptual experience. How-
ever, some structural features may pertain only to experiences in a certain modality. Consider these modality speciﬁc claims:
(iii) Necessarily, auditory experiences represent sound.
(iv) Necessarily, visual experiences represent colour.3
Again these seem, to some degree, to be plausible truths about structural features of experience. For example, Aristotle in
De Anima held that each of the sensory modalities had a proper sensible, that is, an object or property that could only be1 Although people with type 2 blindsight don’t suffer complete loss of V1, the area of V1 loss corresponds to the area of their visual ﬁeld in which they have
type 2 blindsight. Thus, if it can be shown that they have experience in this area of the visual ﬁeld but lack corresponding areas of V1 then there is reason to
believe that V1 is not necessary for visual consciousness.
2 An interesting discussion defending the idea that there are different structural features of vision and touch is found in Soteriou (2011).
3 By ‘‘colour’’ I mean not only chromatic colour but also black, white and grey. I use ‘‘colour’’ this way through out this essay.
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ing, colour in the case of vision, pressure and temperature in the case of touch, smells in the case of olfaction, and tastes in
the case of taste. (Aristotle considered there to be only these ﬁve senses.) The proper sensibles contrast with common sens-
ibles such as shape, which can be represented in more than one modality: vision and touch. For Aristotle the proper sensibles
were the deﬁning features of the sensory modalities. The proper sensibles were that which made each sensory modality the
sensory modality it was. They individuated the senses.4 I will come back to discuss claim (iv) later in this paper.
Some claims about candidate structural features of perceptual experience concern what is not represented in experience:
(v) Necessarily, perceptual experiences do not represent the future.
And some such claims are restricted to experiences in speciﬁc sensory modalities:
(vi) Necessarily, visual experience does not represent sound.
(vii) Necessarily, visual experience does not represent tastes.
Some claims about candidate structural features may be ones that pertain to combinations of representational features:
(viii) Necessarily, auditory experiences represent some volume when they represent some pitch.
(ix) Necessarily, tactile experiences represent only one object as being at any location.
(x) Necessarily, visual experiences represent only one colour to be on a surface at any given time.
(xi) Necessarily, experiences of red are more similar to experiences of orange than they are to experiences of green.5
As I said above, but let me emphasise, I am not claiming that these are propositions that speciﬁc structural features of
perceptual experience, only that they are the sorts of claim worthy of consideration for specifying structural features. Indeed
claims about structural features of perceptual experience are very often particularly difﬁcult to establish. Let me provide you
with one example: whether it is possible for perceptual experiences to represent reddish-green.
Wittgenstein discussed the questions of whether there could be a reddish-green colour, whether a reddish-green colour
could be perceived, or whether the concept of reddish-green even makes sense. Lugg (2010) makes a careful summary of his
remarks suggesting that while the popular interpretation of Wittgenstein has been that at least at some points in his career
he claimed that there could be no perceptual experiences of reddish-green, Wittgenstein ‘‘is genuinely puzzled, that he is
pulled in both directions and cannot commit himself either way.’’ (Lugg, 2010: 172). Nonetheless, perhaps inspired by
Wittgenstein, some philosophers, for example Brenner (1987), have held that there could be no experiences as of a red-
dish-green.
However, this claim looks to be disproved by recent results from Crane and Piantanida (1983) and Billock and Tsou
(2004). They assert that they have created experiences of reddish-green in the laboratory. There are interesting questions
about whether there is clear proof for the existence of such experiences. (See, for example, Lugg (2010) and
Nida-Rümelin and Suarez (2009).) However, if such experiences have been created then a claim that some took to specify
a strong structural feature of perceptual experience has been disproved.6
Faced with such a case, one might wonder how one could ever defend any claim about the structure of experience—either
strong or weak. One might think that the primary evidence that would support a claim about the structural features of expe-
rience would come from the sorts of experience that one has had and the sorts of experience that one has not. However, that
evidence concerns what is the case. How does one get from claims about what is the case to modal claims about what could
be the case—as claims about the structural features of experience are?
One might think that one can extend one’s knowledge from claims about what one has experienced to claims about what
one could experience by drawing on one’s sensory imagination. For example, no one has ever seen the national animal of
Scotland, the unicorn, for such creatures have never existed. Suppose someone had never visually experienced a unicorn
because they had never seen one and had not hallucinated one, or had a visual experience as of one while watching a ﬁlm
or looking at a hologram or the like. Nonetheless, such a person could imagine what it would be like to visually experience a
unicorn—as many people have done. One imagines what it would be like to experience a unicorn by conjoining in the imag-
ination, in the appropriate way, what one knows of what it is like to experience a white horse and what it is like to expe-
rience a white horn. Based on this, it seems right to say that one can know that it would be possible to have an
experience as of a unicorn. Such a combinatorial process allows one to consider numerous experiences that one has not
had and whether they are possible. Despite this, however, one might think that the imagination is limited in an important
respect. How could one come to have knowledge of whether it is possible to experience things that are not simple conjunc-
tions of what one has experienced?4 For more on this topic see Macpherson (2011a).
5 Philosophers who have held that there are necessary resemblance relations between the colours include Armstrong (1987: 44) and Hardin (1993: 66).
6 Brenner would disagree. He thinks that in the situation in which people came to agree that in the Crane and Piantanida experiment they had experiences of
reddish-green, our language would have changed so as to make room for the expression ‘‘reddish-green’’, when previously it did not include it because there
was ‘‘no right or wrong, true or false, employment’’ of the term prior to people reporting such experiences (1987: 209). He says that compared to the old
language, in use before the experiment, the new language ‘‘would express different concepts rather than opposing truth-claims, different forms of description
rather than contrary descriptions.’’ (1987: 210) I disagree. ‘‘Reddish’’ and ‘‘greenish’’ have perfectly good meanings in our language and I can’t see why ‘‘reddish-
green’’ doesn’t inherit it’s meaning from the meaning of each of those two words (both prior to and after Crane and Piantanida’s experiment was carried out).
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to experience that which one has not perceived (and, although Hume did not, we can add here that which one has not had an
experience as of) and which is not something that can be visually imagined by a simple conjoining of things that one has
seen. I will call such things ‘‘novel qualities’’. For example, as Hume famously argued, if one had experienced all the shades
of colour except one particular shade of blue, one might come to be able to imagine what it would be like to experience that
shade if one was presented with all the other shades of blue laid out in order of resemblance. However, cases where one can
imagine novel qualities are few and far between—as Hume himself noted. He states of the missing shade of blue, ‘‘the
instance is so particular and singular, that it is scarce worth our observing’’ (1739–40/1975: 6). Hume goes on to note that,
‘‘We cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine apple [sic], without having actually tasted it’’ (1739–40/1975:
6) He thus foreshadows Jackson (1982) who claims that if one had only had an experience as of black and white and shades
of grey among the colours, one could not come to know what it was like to have an experience as of red.7 Of course, if some-
one has only had experiences as of black, white and grey then they cannot legitimately conclude that experiences as of other
colours, such as red are impossible.
A notable feature of the experiments in which it was claimed that people came to have experiences as of reddish-green is
that before having the experience as of reddish-green, subjects said that they could not imagine what it would be like to have
such an experience, but afterwards they could imagine it. I think that, in general, people who have not had an experience as
of reddish-green, and who have just had typical human experience, cannot imagine reddish-green. I certainly cannot. Given
this, the inability to imagine reddish-green before having the experience would explain why people might have thought that
such experiences were impossible. However, as in the case of red discussed by Jackson in the previous paragraph, we cannot
conclude just from the fact that one has not had a certain type of experience, and the fact that one cannot imagine what such
an experience might be like, that such an experience is not possible.
In arguing about whether a certain sort of experience is possible, there may be further considerations that one can bring
into try to establish the matter. If one were trying to establish that experiences as of reddish-green were impossible then one
might adduce arguments concerning the opponency of the visual system. According to colour opponent theory, information
from the eye is processed in the brain in an antagonistic manner. There are three opponent channels: the red versus green,
the blue versus yellow, and light versus dark. The brain cannot signal the presence of red at a location at the same time as it
signals that there is green at a location. (It could however, indicate that both red and blue were present at the same locations,
in which case, it would be signalling that purple was present.) If all brain processing were subject to these opponent chan-
nels, then one might argue that subjects whose brains were so constrained could never experience reddish-green. (And if one
made a case that their brains were so constrained as a matter of nomological necessity then, in doing so, one would be putt-
ing forward an argument that not being able to be as of reddish-green is a weak structural feature of experience.) However,
Crane and Piantanida (1983) speculate that the ‘‘ﬁlling in’’ process that produces the experience allows the visual cortex to
signal for the presence of red and green at the same location at the same time by allowing it to signal the presence of colours
unconstrained from bottom-up opponent channels.
What the considerations above show is that in every case where we wish to identify structural features of experience, we
will have to look closely at what evidence is available. Evidence from our imagination can play a role in establishing what is a
structural feature; however, the inability to imagine an experience should not be taken as conclusive evidence that such an
experience is impossible. Furthermore, other evidence should be sought and weighed as best we can.
Considering what the structural features of visual experience are will be important in thinking about the nature of
the experiences had by those people who have type 2 blindsight. I will consider whether we can visually experience
something as being at a distance from our body without at the same time having an experience as of its colour.
Can we determine whether or not this is true? Knowing the answer could help settle a debate about the nature of type
2 blindsight.
In the next section, I discuss the nature of type 1 and type 2 blindsight, and outline the question of what is the nature of
the conscious state that is had in type 2 blindsight. I will distinguish between different candidates for what that conscious
state is: a feeling, a perceptual experience, or a thought.7 David Lewis (1988) suggests that one could come to know what it is like to have an experience as of red even if one has only seen or had experiences as of
black, white and grey, or come to know what it is like to have an experiences as of vegemite if one has not perceived or had an experience as of vegemite. His
explanation would equally apply to Hume’s example of the taste of pineapple. He suggests that if one’s brain was put into the state that it would be in right
after one has had an experience as of red, vegemite, or pineapple for the ﬁrst time, then one would know what it was like to have those experiences even though
one had not had them. I think that either such people would know what it was like to see red, taste vegemite or pineapple or they would be in a position to
know what it was like. However, in the former case, I think that they would only know because they would be sensorily imagining or sensorily quasi-
remembering what it was like. (Quasi-remembering is seeming to remember without actually remembering because one’s apparent memory is false.) And it
would be in virtue of having that imaginative or quasi-memory experience that they would know. In the latter case, the people would not be sensorily
imagining or sensorily quasi-remembering what it was like. However, they would be in a position to be able to do in the future. If they did so, then I would say
that at that future point they would come to know what it was like. They would not before. The crucial point is that one can resist the thought that one can
come to know what an experience is like just by being put in a brain state. One can insist that that brain state will only confer knowledge of what it is like by in
some way determining that one has some experience or other with the relevant phenomenal character or it will put one in a position to know in the future
what it is like by causing an appropriate brain state that confers knowledge in virtue of it determining that one has some experience or other with the relevant
phenomenal character.
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According to the traditional conception of blindsight (Weiskrantz, 1986), a subject has blindsight when he or she does not
acknowledge any awareness or consciousness in a portion of his or her visual ﬁeld (the blind ﬁeld), yet nonetheless, some
visual functioning remains intact. Physiologically, blindsight occurs when there is damage to the part of the primary visual
cortex (V1) that corresponds to the blind ﬁeld. Blindsight subjects report that they are totally blind in that area of their visual
ﬁeld. Yet, it can be determined that some information from the blind ﬁeld does affect subjects’ behaviour. In particular, in a
forced choice paradigm, subjects are able to guess with a high degree of accuracy about some features of a stimulus pre-
sented in their blind ﬁeld. For example, Weiskrantz (1997: 23) says that people with blindsight ‘‘have been reported who
are able, in their blind hemiﬁelds, to detect the presence of stimuli, to locate them in space, to discriminate direction of
movement, to discriminate orientation of lines, to be able to judge whether stimuli in the blind ﬁeld match or mismatch
those in the intact hemiﬁeld, and to discriminate between different wavelengths of light, that is, to tell colours apart.’’ People
with blindsight are initially unaware that they have blindsight and are not simply blind. It comes as a surprise to them that
their guesses are accurate, although they can come to know that their guessing is accurate when experimenters tell them so.
It should be noted that subjects cannot generate accurate guesses themselves. One reason is that in the experimental set-
ting in which they display their guessing ability, the experimenter provides two options that they have to choose between,
one of which is accurate. And the experimenter uses his or her knowledge of how the world is in the subjects’ blind ﬁeld to
ensure that there is one accurate option. However, subjects on their own cannot reliably generate two options one of which
corresponds to the way the world is.
It has been found that some patients who have been classiﬁed as having blindsight in fact report some limited conscious-
ness in what is typically called their ‘‘blind ﬁeld’’.8 In response to such cases, Weiskrantz (1998) introduced a distinction
between type 1 and type 2 blindsight. Type 1 blindsight is that which conforms to the traditional deﬁnition above in that no
consciousness corresponding to the stimuli in the blind ﬁeld is reported. Type 2 blindsight is deﬁned as occurring when some
limited consciousness of the stimulus in the blind ﬁeld exists. However, how to characterise this consciousness is a tricky
business.
In attempting to characterise it, some people have focused on the fact that sometimes what is reported in type 2 blind-
sight is a mere conscious ‘‘feeling’’ or conscious ‘‘knowing’’ of the nature of the stimulus—but a conscious state that does not
amount to a visual experience. In his deﬁnition of type 2 blindsight, Weizkrantz states that the nature of the consciousness is
‘‘acknowledged experience of events in the blind ﬁeld in the absence of acknowledged ‘seeing’’’ (1998: xi). So, Weizkrantz,
and others who have endorsed the existence of type 2 blindsight, have claimed that the consciousness that is present in these
cases does not consist of a visual experience of the stimulus or some of its features.
Many of the cases of type 2 blindsight that have been discussed in the literature are type 2 blindsight with respect to
movement. Subjects with type 2 blindsight may have type 1 or type 2 blidsight or be completely blind with respect to other
features of objects in their blind ﬁelds. In contrast to Weizkrantz, other researchers (Zeki and ffytche (1998), Stoerig and
Barth (2001), and ffytche and Zeki (2011)) have claimed that the form of consciousness that type 2 blindsight subjects have
is visual experience. That is, they claim that these subjects have visual experiences of movement (at least sometimes—typ-
ically the more high-contrast the stimulus and the faster it is moving it is the more likely subjects are to report awareness).
These researchers often classify the subjects as having ‘‘Riddoch syndrome’’. Riddoch (1917) examined men injured in war
who reported that they were blind in one half of their visual ﬁelds, except for the fact that they reported seeing movement in
them.9 These researchers noted that type 2 blindsight patients with respect to movement seem to be just like those patients
Riddoch studied. Because they classify the awareness as visual experience they tend not to classify the subjects as having ‘‘type
2 blindsight’’. Why is this? The answer is that if the subjects are having a visual experience, then it is tempting to say that they
are just seeing and hence do not have blindsight.
If type 2 subjects have visual experiences, should we classify them as just seeing and not having type 2 blindsight? The
answer to that question is complicated because a subject who has type 2 blindsight with respect to some feature or features
of an object is typically blind and/or has type 1 blindsight with respect to the other features of objects in the blind ﬁeld. To
illustrate, suppose we placed a red X-shaped object on the left of a subject’s blind ﬁeld and then moved it to the right of that
ﬁeld. A subject might report having some form of consciousness of the left to right movement but deny having any
consciousness of anything else. Moreover, at the same time, the subject could, in a forced choice paradigm, be able to guess
reliably that the shape was that of an X and not be able to guess reliably that it was red. In such a case, the subject would
have type 2 blindsight for the movement of the object, type 1 blindsight for the shape of the object, and simply be blind with
respect to the colour of the object.
With these considerations in mind, what is the answer to the question of whether, if type 2 blindsight involves having a
visual experience, the subject would just be seeing and hence would not have blindsight? The answer is that, at least with
respect to the feature in question that they are visually experiencing, the subject would be seeing that feature. Given that, it
does seem appropriate to question whether it is right to say that those in whom the consciousness amounts to visual8 I will continue to call the area in question the ‘‘blind ﬁeld’’ although, of course, if some consciousness is reported in it, then it may not be totally blind. An
overview of the evidence is given in ffytche and Zeki (2011) and Overgaard (2012).
9 At least in many instances this was the form that the reports took. In other cases it was not so clear and, as per Weizkrantz’s suggestion above, knowledge of
movement was attributed to the subject. See Zeki and ffytche (1998: 26).
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theless, I will stick to calling people who report any form of consciousness of limited features people with type 2 blindsight—
with respect those features that they so report—and I will also speak of their ‘‘blind ﬁelds’’. One reason is that ‘‘Riddoch syn-
drome’’ is only a term that applies to those who reported blindness except for movement. It is useful to have a term that does
not just pertain to cases of reported awareness of movement. Another reason is that it is very useful to have a term that
applies to those who report some consciousness of just one, or a limited number, of features in the presence of either blind-
ness or type 1 blindsight for other features, where the terms leaves open what the nature that awareness is. For it is useful to
ask of such people whether we can determine whether their awareness is a feeling, a visual experience, or knowledge, or
judgment of a feature of an object.
To summarise: psychologists have identiﬁed a group of subjects who report being, for the most part, blind in a portion of
their visual ﬁelds. Those subjects do, however, report some form of consciousness of movement—and only movement—in
that ﬁeld. Some researchers think that the awareness is a feeling, or knowing, or judging. Other researchers think that the
awareness is a visual experience—a minimal or highly degraded one that represents a limited number of features of a stim-
ulus. In either case, I will classify these subjects as having type 2 blindsight and investigate what we can determine about the
nature of their conscious mental state. Do they have visual experiences or do they have some other type of conscious mental
state? I will set aside the worry that, if it turns out that these subjects have visual experiences, then the term ‘‘type 2 blind-
sight’’ may not turn out to be the most appropriate nomenclature for their condition for it would be appropriate to say that
the subjects see the feature that they claim awareness of.
I said earlier in this section that many cases of type 2 blindsight involved subjects reporting consciousness of movement.
A case not involving movement is reported by Overgaard et al. (2008) who investigated a subject GR. When subject to stan-
dard blindsight testing, GR displays behaviour which would lead one to classify her as having type 1 blindsight. For example,
when asked whether she can detect stimuli in a certain portion of her visual ﬁeld, given only the options of answering ‘‘yes’’
or ‘‘no’’, she reports that she does not. When a letter is presented in that portion of her visual ﬁeld and she is asked to guess in
a forced choice paradigm whether the letter is ‘‘A’’, ‘‘B’’ or ‘‘C’’, she performs better than chance. However, Overgaard et al.
tested GR further. They asked her to rate her experience on a four point scale:
(CI) ‘clear image’, (ACI) ‘almost clear image’ (meaning ‘I think I know what was shown’), (WG) ‘weak glimpse’ (meaning
‘something was there but I had no idea what it was’), and (NS) ‘not seen’ (2008: 1).
When GR was tested in the damaged portion of her visual ﬁeld on thirty-three occasions, seven were reported as ‘‘clear
image’’, eleven as ‘‘almost clear image’’, twelve as ‘‘weak glimpse’’, and three as ‘‘not seen’’. Moreover, there was a positive
relationship between the accuracy of the ‘‘guess’’ about what the stimulus was and the clarity of the experience. In fact, there
was the same relationship between accuracy and clarity in her blind ﬁeld as there was in her intact ﬁeld. These results indi-
cate that GR does have some consciousness of the stimulus. It therefore seems right to classify her not as having type 1 blind-
sight, but type 2.10
As in the case of those who have type 2 blindsight with respect to movement, researchers have different views about
what kind of consciousness to ascribe to GR. Overgaard et al. (2008) and Overgaard and Grünbaum (2011) argue that GR
has a visual experience, while Brogaard (2011, 2012) argues that GR only has a conscious thought that is about the nature
of the stimulus.
In this section, I have explained the difference between type 1 and type 2 blindsight and brieﬂy outlined the different
answers in the debate about the nature of the awareness had in type 2 blindsight. Some say that it is a feeling or thought.
Others say that it is a visual experience—albeit a degraded one. In the next section, I give an account of what these different
types of mental state are. I argue that the consciousness of those with type 2 blindsight should not be described as a feeling.
The only serious options for what the nature of their awareness or consciousness is, is a visual experience or a conscious
thought.
3. Types of mental state
What is the difference between feelings, thoughts, and visual experiences?
Thoughts are a type of propositional attitude. Other types of propositional attitudes include beliefs and desires. When one
has a propositional attitType 2 blindsight ude one takes an attitude, such as holding it to be true in the case of belief, or want-
ing it to be true in the case of desire, to some proposition. For example, if one believes that Scotland should be independent,
then one takes the attitude of holding it to be true towards the proposition that Scotland should be an independent country.
If one desires that Scotland be an independent country, then one takes the attitude of wanting it to be true that Scotland is an
independent country. When one has a thought about something one can be merely entertaining a proposition (considering
whether a proposition is true), or one can be endorsing a proposition. Propositional attitudes are representational states.
They are about something, and what they are about is speciﬁed by the proposition to which one takes an attitude. In the10 Overgaard (2012) suggests that other blindsight subjects should be tested in this manner. Although he does not quite go so far as to suggest it, a radical
thought that his work might give rise to is that perhaps all people with blindsight really have type 2 blindsight, rather than type 1. Perhaps this has not been
realised because testing to date for awareness or consciousness of the stimulus has not been subtle enough. This is a controversial suggestion, but one that
would be worth investigating.
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country, speciﬁes that which is represented.
Thoughts, unlike beliefs and desires, are always occurrent states rather than dispositional states. Thoughts can be con-
scious or unconscious. There is an interesting question as to whether conscious thoughts have phenomenal character.11
One view is that in and of themselves they do not, but that they are usually or always accompanied by states that do. In par-
ticular, they might be accompanied by visual imagery. In the case of thinking that Scotland should be an independent country,
perhaps one has visual imagery of mountains and lochs, the Saltire, and the face of William Wallace. The thought might also be
accompanied by auditory imagery. For example, one might hear the words ‘‘Scotland should be an independent country’’, or
‘‘Freedom’’, in one’s own inner voice. On this view, no imagery in particular is essential to thinking the thought (although
one might think that some imagery or other usually or always does so). Someone else might have visual imagery of Glasgow
and of the faces of Robert the Bruce and the Black Douglas. And they might not have auditory imagery of the words ‘‘Scotland
should be an independent country’’, but the French words ‘‘Ecosse devrait être un pays indépendant’’. Another view, however, is
that thoughts have their own proprietary phenomenal character associated with grasping the meaning of the proposition.
Contrasting with the propositional attitudes are feelings, also known as ‘‘sensations’’, such as pains, itches and tickles.
These states clearly have phenomenal character, and indeed plausibly, theses states are individuated by their phenomenal
character: what makes a pain a pain is the way that it feels, and what makes an itch an itch is the distinctive itchy feel that
such states have. Thus feelings and sensations have been thought of as essentially conscious states.
Traditionally feelings have been conceived of in philosophy as states that do not represent. Why is that? Thomas Reid
(1785/2002: I. i. 36) said that sensation, ‘‘hath no object distinct from the act itself’’. The idea is that if I have a sensation
of pain, there is no object—a pain—that I am sensing. My sensation is not ‘of’ any object, therefore it is not representational.
More recently, the traditional view of feelings as non-representational has been questioned. It is agreed that feeling states,
such as pains and itches, do not represent objects called feelings—objects that are pains or itches. Rather, it is claimed that
feelings represent different states of the body. (See Armstrong (1962, 1968) and Pitcher (1970, 1971) and, more recently, Tye
(2006a, 2006b).) For example, a throbbing pain in one’s big toe might represent that there is an increase and decrease in the
volume of damaged and inﬂamed tissues in one’s toe. A sharp stabbing pain in the chest might represent that something
pointed is entering and tearing asunder the ﬂesh in one’s upper torso. A feeling of hunger might represent one’s stomach
contractions and low blood glucose.
Perceptual experiences have been traditionally thought of as hybrid states: being somewhat like the propositional atti-
tudes and somewhat like feelings or sensations. Like the propositional attitudes, perceptual experiences seem to represent
and be about things in the world. My present visual experience of a teapot seems to represent a silver object with a round
body with various protrusions, corresponding to the handle, spout and knob of the lid. My auditory experience of the
whistle of the kettle, represents a high-pitched loud note.12 At the same time, like feelings and sensations, perceptual expe-
riences are essentially conscious states that have phenomenal character that differentiates one perceptual experience from
another.
Given the characterisation of these three types of states that are the candidates for what kind of state a person with type 2
blindsight is in, it is clear that feelings are just not good candidates. The reason is that the people with type 2 blindsight say
that they have a feeling about some state of affairs in the world. For example, they say that they have a feeling that some-
thing in front of them is moving. Such a state would be a state that represented something in the world exterior to their
body. As feelings are either not representational at all, or they represent something happening to the body, they are not
the type of state that those with type 2 blindsight are reporting.
We can explain, nonetheless, why it is the case that people with type 2 blindsight use the word ‘‘feeling’’ to describe their
mental state. Sometimes in everyday language we use this word to indicate that we are not quite sure what kind of mental
state we are in. One might say, ‘‘I have a feeling that our guests are arriving on Tuesday’’, when one wants to report that one
has some evidence to this effect but one isn’t quite sure where from. One might not know whether one remembers this, or
whether one is guessing at this based on what one was previously told about the travel plans (say that some other destina-
tion would be reached by Monday), or whether one has worked it out based on the time one knows it takes to travel between
certain places, or what have you. However, although this everyday usage is perfectly acceptable, that does not mean that we
should take such talk to imply that subjects mean that the person has feelings in the sense outlined above. Therefore, I will
limit my investigation of the mental states of people with type 2 blindsight to the investigation of whether such people are
having visual experiences or whether they are having thoughts.
How does one determine whether someone is having a conscious thought about something or whether he or she is having
a perceptual experience? That is a very tricky question indeed. Perceptual experience seems to inform us of the way the11 Sometimes the words ‘‘phenomenal character’’ and ‘‘qualia’’ are used interchangeably. However, sometimes ‘‘phenomenal character’’ is taken to be a
philosophically neutral term referring to the subjective qualities of experience, while ‘‘qualia’’ is taken to be a philosophically loaded term implying that the
qualities in question are as a Cartesian would take them to be: private, ineffable, one we are infallible about, and nonphysical. I use ‘‘phenomenal character’’
throughout this essay to remain philosophically neutral about the nature of those qualities. Others that I quote will sometimes use ‘‘qualia’’. I take them to
mean ‘‘phenomenal character’’ in all instances.
12 Some philosophers, direct realists, have lately claimed that our experiences do not represent the world. Rather, our experience consists in having the world
presented to us immediately with no need for intermediate representations. I set this view aside because even if it were true, a crucial difference between
feelings and perceptual experiences would exist. Those experiences would either represent or present the world, while feelings either do not represent or
present anything, or represent or present only the body.
F. Macpherson / Consciousness and Cognition 32 (2015) 104–128 111world is now. (At least it seems that way to us: even if we are looking at a distant star and our experience is actually inform-
ing us of an event that took place many years ago.) However, we may not believe that the world is as our experience presents
it to be. For example, one might think that one is suffering from an illusion or a hallucination and so not be inclined to believe
what one’s experience seems to tell one. To this extent, experience is different from belief. However, we are considering how
to distinguish experience from thought. One could certainly entertain the thought that this is how the world seems, yet be
inclined to desist believing that is how it is because one has reason to not to fully trust the thought in question. So we have
no reason yet to distinguish experience and thought.
One way in which thought and perceptual experience are different is with respect to their phenomenal character. Percep-
tual experience typically seems to be about the about the world in front of one at a distance from one’s body. It typically tells
one, among other things, about colours, shapes, sizes, positions, movements, and so on.13 Clearly thought can be about this
too—although it can be about many more things than it seems visual experience, and perceptual experience more generally, can
be about. However, what it is like to visually experience colour or shape or size or movement is different to what it is like to
think about these things, if indeed there is anything it is like to think about them. But what one can say about this difference is
unclear, not least because there is such discord in thinking about the phenomenal character of thought—as I outlined earlier in
this section—and not least because it is hard to describe the phenomenal character of visual experience other than to say what it
is an experience as of. Nonetheless, although describing differences in phenomenal character is difﬁcult, and although there are
different views about the phenomenal character of thought, I take it that visual experience has a distinctive phenomenal char-
acter either because thought has a different one or lacks one. Thus, in ascribing a visual experience to a person, one is ascribing
to them a distinctive sort of phenomenal character. I discuss this topic in greater length in the section below.
There may be other differences between thought and perceptual experience. For example, some people think that thought
is conceptual while visual experience is, or is in part, or can be nonconceptual. However, I leave this topic aside for I don’t
believe that even if there is this difference, it will help to settle the question of which state is had by people with type 2
blindsight.
How one could test for perceptual experience rather than thought—as opposed to merely knowing what the difference is
between them—is a difﬁcult matter too. One might think that one could simply scan the brain and see if the visual areas of
the brain are active, However, one can only know what parts of the brain correspond to visual experience by correlating
reports of visual experience, and its lack, with brain activity. When we are dealing with blindsight, an important and perti-
nent issue is what areas of the brain should be taken to give rise to visual experience. Stoerig and Barth (2001) and ffytche
and Zeki (2011) use their conclusion that people with type 2 blindsight are having visual experiences to deny the claim that
has often been made that activation in the V1 areas of the visual cortex is necessary for visual experience. Therefore, we can-
not rely on evidence about what areas of the brain are active as a guide to what kind of mental state is being had by the
subject.
In this section, I have argued that people with type 2 blindsight are either having conscious thoughts about the stimuli in
their blind ﬁelds or they are having visual experiences. They are not having feelings. Perceptual experiences have different
phenomenal character to conscious thoughts, if indeed the latter have phenomenal character. In the next section, I go on to
examine the evidence and the arguments that have been put forward by both sides concerning whether the type 2 blindsight
subject is consciously thinking about or visually experiencing the world.
4. The evidence and extant arguments about type 2 blindsight
Are type 2 blindsight subjects having degraded visual experiences of some sort or are they having conscious thoughts?
Let’s look at the evidence from the subjective reports of various subjects.
Zeki and ffytche (1998) examined Riddoch’s (1917) accounts of the subjective reports of his patients. In all these cases, the
patients ‘‘were able to detect the presence of motion within their scotomatous ﬁelds, without being able to characterize the
other attributes of the stimulus’’ (1998: 26). Here are the reports:
Patient 1: ‘‘The ‘moving things’ have no distinct shape, and the nearest approach to colour that can be attributed to them
is a shadowy grey’’.
Patient 2: ‘The ‘moving something’ had neither form nor colour. It gave him the impression of a shadow’’.
Patient 3: ‘‘could detect the movement of feet in the street ‘. . . though they had no shape’’’
Patient 4: ‘‘. . . declared he could distinguish no object . . . but he knew that something had moved through his blind ﬁeld’’
Patient 5: ‘They [the moving objects] don’t appear to have any colour or shape. They look like shadows. Sometimes I can
tell if the moving things are white.’’ (1998: 26)
In each of these cases it is clear that movement is reported. It is important to distinguish the question of whether subjects
could identify the colour of the stimulus from the question of whether they had an experience of some colour or other, and
this is not clearly enough done in the reports of the subjects’ experience. Subjects clearly could not detect the colour of the
stimulus. (Although one subject says that they could tell if something was white, this is an anomalous report.) However, the13 Exactly what the contents of experience can be is an interesting question that is discussed at length in Hawley and Macpherson (2011).
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jects visually experience dark grey indeterminate shapes moving on a slightly lighter grey or slightly darker grey back-
ground. Another view is that subjects have visual experiences without experiencing any colour properties. A third view is
that the subjects did not have visual experiences, they only had thoughts. The best candidate for the thought that they
had is that it was a thought that something moved, perhaps more speciﬁcally the thought that something moved in a certain
direction, with a certain speed. Which of these views is true is unclear.
ffytche and Zeki (2011) found two subjects, GN and FB , who were very similar to the patients of Riddoch (1917) in terms
of their reports and responses. In addition to reporting consciousness of the stimulus, GN and FB ‘‘could prepare drawings of
what they had perceived in their blind ﬁeld, which compare favourably with the drawings of the same stimuli when pre-
sented to their intact ﬁelds’’ (2001: 254). ffytche and Zeki go on to say ‘‘their drawings and . . . descriptions left us in no doubt
that the experiences they had were visual in nature and amounted to what might be called ‘visual qualia’’’ (2011: 254).
However, their conclusion goes rather beyond the available evidence because one could draw a picture of how one thought
the world was, rather than how one experienced the world to be.
Another person with type 2 blindsight for movement who has been studied in modern times is GY. Zeki and ffytche
(1998: 29) report that in 1993, GY described his visual experiences as dark and shadowy. However, later, in 1994, he changed
his mind. He now said that he had a ‘‘’feeling’ of something happening in his blind ﬁeld and, given the right conditions, that
he is absolutely sure of the occurrence’’ (1998: 29). When Zeki and ffytche pointed out to him that his description had chan-
ged he said that he had previously ‘‘been using language that he thought a normally sighted person would understand’’
(1998: 29–30). Two years later, in 1996, he said his experience was ‘‘as that of ‘a black shadow moving on a black back-
ground’, adding that ‘shadow is the nearest I can get to putting it into words so that people can understand’. (1998: 30).
When Zeki and ffytche tested GY’s blindsight for movement, they asked him to indicate the direction of movement of a
stimulus and his level of awareness on a four point scale, similar to the way in which Overgaard et al. (2008) tested GR
(described in section two above). Like Overgaard et al., Zeki and ffytche found that GY reported consciousness of movement
more frequently when he was given the four-point scale to use, compared to the condition in which he had to indicate with a
‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ whether he was conscious. Moreover, his ability to correctly identify the direction of the movement correlated
positively with his reports of awareness.14 The evidence from these varying reports of GY is not enough to settle the question of
the nature of his conscious state one way or the other.
GY has been investigated by other experimenters concerning the nature of his consciousness. Unfortunately, the evidence
points in opposite directions as to the nature of his consciousness. Stoerig and Barth (2001) report that GY denies seeing. And
they cite previous descriptions that GY has given of his experience: ‘‘He is aware of ‘something moving’ but it appears as
‘black on black,’ like ‘a mouse under a blanket’ (personal communication), or ‘similar to that of a normally sighted man
who, with his eyes shut against sunlight, can perceive the direction of motion of a hand waved in front of him’ (Beckers
& Zeki, 1995, p. 56).’’ (2001: 582). They also report that ‘‘in other experiments he has, for instance, stressed an absence of
color sensation’’ (2001: 582). Yet, they found that despite denying seeing, when a moving texture of low contrast was pre-
sented to GY in his intact visual ﬁeld, he accepted that it created the same conscious state in him as a high-contrast bar mov-
ing in his blind ﬁeld. Furthermore, they found an even better match when they used an apparent motion stimulus.15 Stoerig
and Barth conclude that as a match with a visual experience was made, GY’s awareness or consciousness in his blind ﬁeld is just
the same as the visual experience he has in his intact ﬁeld. This is a minimal or degraded experience: one that they describe as
having a ‘‘reduced phenomenal content’’ (2001: 584).
In contrast, Persaud and Lau (2008) gave GY several deﬁnitions of ‘‘qualia’’, a term that I take them to hold is synonymous
with ‘‘phenomenal character’’.16 They then questioned GY as to whether he experienced any qualia in his blind ﬁeld. His
answer was that he denied ‘‘having visual qualia of stationary stimuli in his affected ﬁeld. He was adamant that he never
has visual qualia in his affected ﬁeld in everyday life.’’ (2008: 1048). And asked whether he had qualia of moving stimuli in
the affected ﬁeld he replied ‘‘No, never’’ (2008: 1047). So the evidence about GY’s conscious state ﬂip-ﬂops over time, and is
dependent on how he is tested and what he is asked.
Finally, the last piece of evidence comes from the Overgaard et al. (2008) study of GR, outlined in section two above.
Recall that previous to their investigations, GR had been classiﬁed as having type 1 blindsight. When asked whether or
not she can detect stimuli in her blind ﬁeld and given only the options of answering ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’, she reports that she does
not. Overgaard et al. then asked GR to rate her experience in the blind ﬁeld on a four point scale, ‘‘(CI) ‘clear image’, (ACI)
‘almost clear image’ (meaning ‘I think I know what was shown’), (WG) ‘weak glimpse’ (meaning ‘something was there
but I had no idea what it was’), and (NS) ‘not seen’’’ (2008: 1). Out of thirty-three occasions, GR reported seven times a ‘‘clear
image’’, eleven times an ‘‘almost clear image’’, twelve times a ‘‘weak glimpse’’, and three times ‘‘not seen’’. In light of this
evidence it seems that we should classify GR as having type 2 blindsight, but what we should conclude about her conscious
state is that it is not clear what its nature is.14 Although reports of experience correlates with performance in some cases, there are examples where this is not so, for example, in the original blindsight
patient DB, as discussed in Weiskrantz (1986).
15 Note that when GY accepted that a low-contrast moving texture resembled his blind ﬁeld experience this was only after extensive testing with many, many
other low-contrast textures. In addition, there was no attempt to test whether this resemblance was reliable.
16 See footnote.8
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the mental states of those with type 2 blindsight are inconclusive. The evidence is mixed and points in different directions.
Those who believe that people with type 2 blindsight are having visual experience point to the evidence which suggests that
they are having visual experience; those who deny this draw attention to the evidence which suggests otherwise. Both sides
rightly warn of taking introspective reports at face value. I will now look at different arguments that have been made by
researchers in favour of one or other of the positions that people with type 2 blindsight are either having (possibly minimal
or degraded) visual experiences or that they are having conscious thoughts. These arguments go beyond the citation of the
introspective reports in the different conditions mentioned above.
One argument in favour of the idea that people with type 2 blindsight are having a visual experience (and hence visual
phenomenal character or qualia) is inspired by the causal origin of the reported awareness. For example, Overgaard and
Grünbaum suggest that there is reason to hold that if a subject reports a conscious mental state and that it is caused by visual
stimuli then the state should count as a visual experience. They state, ‘‘a visual process is one in which a subject at some level
reacts to something visual. From this . . . it should follow that if there is any kind of preserved conscious experience in blind-
sight subjects caused by visual stimuli . . . those experiences should be conceived of as visual’’ (2011: 1858).17
This argument is spurious. There are many counterexamples which spring from noting that the nature of the stimulus, the
nature of the sensory organ, and the kind of early perceptual processing that takes place does not ﬁx the nature of the con-
scious state that is subsequently had by a subject. First, there are examples in which the nature of the stimulus, the nature of
the sensory organ, and the kind of early perceptual processing that takes place may all be of one modality, while the sub-
sequent experience is in a different modality. For example, in synaesthesia, people have an experience in one modality,
say a visual experience of redness, caused by a visual stimulus affecting their eyes, which leads to visual processing. How-
ever, at the same time another experience in a different modality is also caused to occur in them, such as an auditory expe-
rience of sound. What this shows us is that the criteria for which type of experience is being had is not the same as which
type of stimulus, sensory organ, or perceptual processing is taking place. Although often the modality of the experience will
match the modality of the stimulus, organ and processing, it need not. These can come apart in interesting ways.18
Second, there are examples in which the nature of an experience had in one modality is affected by processing in another
modality—typically in cases labelled as ‘‘cross-modal illusions’’.19 For example, in the McGurk effect when an auditory stim-
ulus—a /ba/ sound—is heard alone, it is typically reported accurately as a /ba/ sound. But when it is heard whilst looking at lips
making movements that would produce a /ga/ sound, then people typically report hearing a /da/ sound instead (McGurk &
MacDonald, 1976). Their auditory experience of the /da/ sound has as a causal origin both auditory and visual stimuli, sensory
organs, and processing. Another example is the sound-induced illusory ﬂash experience. When one ﬂash is presented together
with two tones, subjects frequently reported that they saw two ﬂashes (Shams, Kamitani, & Shimojo, 2000). In this example, at
least one of the visual experiences of the ﬂash had both auditory and visual stimuli, sensory organs, and processing. There are
many other such cross-modal illusions.
Third, there are clear cases in which stimuli, sensory organ activation, and processing all belonging to the same modality
cause conscious states other than perceptual experiences. For example, on seeing something or hearing something, or both,
one might become incredibly sad, or happy, or angry. Emotions are not perceptual experiences but they are frequently
caused by perceptual stimuli, sensory organ activation, and processing. Thoughts beliefs, desires, and volitions can be caused
by perceptual stimuli, sensory organ activation, and processing. Likewise, if there are any examples of type 1 blindsight, or
any form of unconscious perception such as that apparently caused by masking, then there will be examples of conscious
thoughts involved in guessing that are not perceptual experiences.
In short, one cannot argue that the modality of the stimulus, the sensory organ, and the existence of perceptual process-
ing, entails that a subsequent conscious state is a perceptual experience of one modality or another. Nor can one even deter-
mine that it will be a perceptual experience, rather than some other kind of mental state. Thus, the argument just considered
for the conclusion that the conscious mental state of those with type 2 blindsight is not sound.
In contrast to Overgaard and Grünbaum (2011), Brogaard (2011, 2012) argues that, based on the evidence to date, there is
reason to believe that those with type 2 blindsight are having thoughts about the world and not visual experiences. (She in
fact thinks that whether or not in the end she is right about this is an open question that could be settled in the future by
some further detailed study of subjects who are more thoroughly instructed with respect to, and asked about their own, phe-
nomenal character. However, from now on, I will present her arguments in favour of the view that those with type 2 blind-
sight lack visual experience and have merely conscious thoughts without this qualiﬁcation.) Brogaard holds that people with
type 2 blindsight have thoughts about the stimulus in response to their guessing about the way the world is. She says,17 Their comments come in debate with Brogaard after they claim that she has not shown that the phenomenology of type 2 blindsight is clearly cognitive.
Zeki and ffychte engage in a similar line of reasoning. They state, ‘‘Such experience as these subjects have, whether described as seeing or feeling, is triggered by
a visual stimulus and is therefore a visual experience.’’ However, they admit that they would have no way to show that such ‘‘visual experiences’’ have visual
phenomenal character—and hence using my conception of visual experience they would not have shown that there was a visual experience present. It is worth
noting that, when discussing GN and FB who they explicitly liken to GY, ffytche and Zeki changed their mind from the earlier paper about what can be
established and now state ‘‘These descriptions left us in no doubt that the experiences they had were visual in nature and amounted to what might be called
‘visual qualia’’’ (2011: 254).
18 See Macpherson (2011b).
19 I say that they are labeled ‘‘cross-modal illusions’’ because whether they are all illusions or some should be classiﬁed as hallucinations in open to debate.
For example, in the sound-ﬂash ‘‘illusion’’ it is arguable whether one of the ﬂashes is a hallucination, rather than an illusion.
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individuals have when a visual stimulus is presented to them. . . it has not been shown that the phenomenal consciousness
blindsight involves is distinctly visual. I suspect that it is not’’ (2011: 459). Brogaard’s argument for this is that the proximal
cause of a visual experience is the visual stimulus, the stimulation of the eyes, and visual processing, but this is not the prox-
imal cause of the conscious state of the type 2 blindsight subject. The cause of the conscious state of those with type 2 blind-
sight includes the visual stimulus, the stimulation of the eyes, and visual processing, but it has other causes besides. The
conscious state of those with type 2 blindsight has guessing as a proximal cause. Moreover, the proximal cause of the guess-
ing is not the same as that of visual experience either. She states, ‘‘different mechanisms no doubt underlie guesses and see-
ings. So guesses and seeings have different proximate causes’’ (2012: 596).20
Do we have evidence that people with type 2 blindsight only have the conscious state they report when they make
guesses, which is what Brogaard’s account requires? One might think that there is such evidence. After all, in some cases
outlined above, it is only when subjects were asked to guess what was in front of them that they reported that they had some
conscious state (and even then only when they were asked whether they had some conscious state using the four-point
scale, rather than when asked simply to state whether or not they were conscious of the stimulus). However, it is unclear
whether Riddochs’ patients only responded that they were aware of movement when asked to guess or whether they spon-
taneously reported it. And the same seems true of GY—although admittedly his case history is complex. However, even if
guessing was not required, that does not stop the subjects in question simply having spontaneous thoughts—as opposed
to visual experiences— about their situation. Thus, although Brogaard’s account requires guessing, a very similar one that
requires only thoughts does not require the evidence about guessing to turn out one way rather than another. Moreover,
even if it turned out that subjects did only have the conscious mental state when they guessed, this does not guarantee that
their conscious mental state is a though. It could be that they have conscious visual experiences and that guessing is required
in order for the people to have those conscious visual experiences. For example, it could be that in order to have a visual
experience, people with type 2 blindsight have to focus their attention in a certain way, and that this is facilitated by guess-
ing. This is just one suggestion; there may be others that could explain why the subjects only had a visual experience when
they guessed. In short, I don’t see that we have good evidence that guessing is the proximal stimulus of the conscious state
that people with type 2 blindsight report, and even if it were, that is not enough to show that those people are not having
visual experiences.
A second argument is used by Brogaard to suggest that those with type 2 blindsight are having conscious thoughts rather
than having visual experiences. Speaking of those who report awareness of movement, she states, ‘‘even if a stimulus per-
haps does give rise to an experience with a ‘‘clear’’ phenomenology, this does not provide any evidence of visual awareness of
color, shape, or location’’ (2011: 458), and ‘‘blindsighters lack the sort of distinctly visual awareness that includes a purely
qualitative color phenomenology’’ (2011: 459). Those attributes, she implies, are necessary for having a visual experience,
and because subjects lack them, they are not having visual experience and are only having conscious thoughts about the
stimuli.21
As stated brieﬂy above, it is not clear whether those subjects who are aware of movement are aware of colour. One prob-
lem is that those who are reporting on the experiences sometimes say that the subjects were not aware of the colour prop-
erties of the stimulus. However, while it is clear that subjects can’t tell what colour things are in the world, it is not so
obvious whether they experience the world as being some colour or other—even if it does not have that colour. On the
one hand, it seems as if the conscious awareness reported is sometimes of a dark shadow moving against a darker back-
ground. This would be an experience of:
 colour: dark grey and black
 form: an indeterminate shadowy shape, and
 movement: from one direction to another.
We can certainly have visual experiences like those. If we get people reporting awareness of those features, then a crucial
premise of Brogaard’s argument is false and she lacks a good reason to deny visual experience to people who have such
awareness.22
However, on the other hand, there is reason to think that the experience is even more minimal—at least in some subjects.
This would be an experience of:20 Sometimes Brigaard speaks as if the conscious state is a guessing, which is a matter of having a certain thought. At other times she speaks as if the conscious
state is a thought had in response to guessing. The latter view is I think the best way to understand her, and I adopt it in the main text. Nothing much turns on
which view Brogaard intends.
21 ‘‘Colour’’ here means not only chromatic colour but also black, white and grey. C.f. footnote.1
22 There is a report in Perenin and Jeannerod (1978: 4) of blindsighted subjects having ‘‘the feeling that a quite bright light had been turned on in the impaired
part of their visual ﬁeld, and was spreading from there into the normal ﬁeld. But none of the subjects could ‘‘see’’ the form or size of the target, nor have any
conscious idea about its location, which they only ‘‘guessed’’ when required to respond in the tests.’’ And in Barbur et al. (1980: 921) of patient G in whom
‘‘[m]ore intense stimulation of the ’blind’ hemiﬁeld gives a sensation of a well-localized bright ﬂash. It is unclear from the reports whether these are reports of
type 2 blindsight ‘‘feelings’’, or not. If they were then, like the cases where dark shadows are reported, they would show that one of Brogaard’s premises was
false, at least regarding some type 2 blindsight patients. As stated in the main text, the argumentation of Brogaard and my response in this chapter does not
therefore apply to such cases—only to cases in which feelings of colour are not reported.
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 form: an experience of an area lacking clear boundaries
 but no colour.
Why would one think this? GY and the patients of Riddoch say that their experience is somewhat like looking at a sha-
dow. But they don’t straightforwardly say that it is like looking at a dark shadow moving on a dark background. It is as if
subjects are gesturing to something that is not quite like a shadow. When it was pointed out to GY that he had changed
his description from having a visual experience of a shadow (1980) to just having a feeling (1994), he said he was using lan-
guage that he thought the sighted would understand by mentioning shadows. In 1996 ‘‘he described his experience as that of
‘a black shadow moving on a black background’, adding that ‘shadow is the nearest I can get to putting it into words so that
people can understand’’ (Zeki & ffytche, 1998: 30). This provides reason to think that some subjects are having very minimal
visual experiences: movement without colour and rather indeterminate form.
As we have seen, it is very hard to determine what the conscious mental states of people with type 2 blindsight are like.
But let us suppose, as Brogaard does—and as we have seen there is some, although not conclusive, evidence to suppose—that
those with type 2 blindsight (or at least some people with type 2 blindsight) do have awareness of movement and indeter-
minate form without colour. Is Brogaard right to think that this is good reason to think that those with this condition lack
visual experiences and hence lack visual phenomenology? I will investigate this claim by considering whether there could be
other minimal visual experiences of movement or form without colour. In other words, what I want to do is to investigate
whether the following claim about an alleged structural feature of experience, mentioned in section one above, is true:
(iv) Necessarily, visual experiences represent colour.
Brogaard’s argument requires that it is. But as we have seen it is exceptionally difﬁcult to establish the existence of any
structural features of experience. What evidence is there that this claim about an alleged structural feature of experience is
true?
As I explained in section one, Aristotle said that sight can be deﬁned as the perception of colour. (See Sorabji (1971) for a
clear commentary on this point focusing on Aristotle’s De Anima, Book II, chapters 4 and 6. Sorabji claims that for Aristotle,
this claim is not put forward as a truth that holds in all possible worlds, but that people may consider that it does.) Sorabji
goes on to say that if one holds this view one should go on to say that there can be no visual experience without experience of
colour. Size, shape, and movement are visually experienced in virtue of experiencing coloured things. Other philosophers
have echoed this thought. Pete Mandik, for example, considers the question, ‘‘Can there be a visual experience devoid of both
color phenomenology and black-and-white phenomenology?’’ (2014: 225) and answers ‘‘While I’ve not conducted anything
remotely resembling a formal survey, I’m pretty conﬁdent that most philosophers of mind will answer ‘no’’’ (2014: 228).23
John Hyman, who cites both Aristotle and James Clerk Maxwell as inspiration, says:
colours, like smells and tastes, are basic properties, relative to the sense with which we perceive them. In other words,
whatever else we perceive by the sense of smell–for example, that a fruit is rotten or that a child is ill— we perceive
by smelling smells; whatever else we perceive by taste we perceive by tasting tastes; and whatever else we perceive
by sight, we perceive by seeing colors—including the achromatic colors, of course. For example, I cannot see the shape
of a banana except by seeing its spatial boundaries, however ﬂeeting and uncertain this experience may be, And I cannot
see its spatial boundaries except by seeing the differences of color that make it visibly distinct from its surroundings. That
is why, as James Clerk Maxwell pointed out, all vision is color vision (Hyman, 2006: 18).
But is it? Surprisingly little evidence is garnered by those who state that it is. Usually it is stated in the manner that
Hyman and Brogaard state it: as a fact; and any backing is given by citing Aristotle, Maxwell and other luminaries in an argu-
ment from authority. I suspect that the alleged fact is taken to be obvious based on repeated introspections of only visual
experiences that are of coloured things. However, as I argued in section one, this is not good evidence in support of their
being such structural features of experience.
In the next section, I consider evidence that we might have against colour being a necessary feature of visual experience—
that is against colour being a structural feature of visual experience. I will begin by considering the nature of sensory sub-
stitution. I will argue that there are two plausible interpretations of subjects with congential blindness using tactile visual
sensory substitution. One interpretation is that they are not having any new perceptual experiences. The other is that they
are having new visual experiences of distal form that are not experiences of colour. If the latter interpretation were true, it
would show that colour is not a structural feature of visual experience. However, unfortunately, the interpretation that they
are not having new visual experiences cannot be completely ruled out. I will then consider the cases of an achromatopsic
who can experience distal form created by chromatic boundaries alone, phantom contours, and amodal completion. I argue
that these provide evidence of visual experience of distal form and movement with no differences in colour, luminance or
texture, but without the complete lack of these. Such experiences provide an alternative explanation of type 2 blindsight
and their existence lends support to the idea that there could be visual experiences in the absence of experience of colour.23 Mandik (2014) himself argues ‘‘yes’’.
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having visual experiences and it should be rejected.
5. Is Colour a Structural Feature of Visual Experience?
Do we have any evidence of the existence of visual experiences that lack colour? We do. Consider, ﬁrst, sensory substi-
tution in which one sense is used to try to replace another. In cases of sensory substitution attempts are made to deliver
information to a subject via a sense that does not usually deliver that information. Consider a particular kind of sensory sub-
stitution: tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS).24 A camera produces a black and white picture of the world. This image
drives a series of pins arranged in a grid that correspond to the image. The grid is placed against an area of a subject’s skin, such
as the back or the stomach. The white areas of the image make the pins in the corresponding area of the grid push forward into
and/or vibrate against the skin of the subject.
After a few hours of practice in which subjects were able to move the camera and receive feedback on what the camera
was detecting—for example by the experimenter telling them and by the subject feeling what the camera was pointed at—
subjects could recognise a range of common objects, point accurately to objects in space, and judge their distance and abso-
lute size. After about thirty hours they could make complex pattern discriminations, recognise the faces of members of lab-
oratory staff, and display a looming response when the camera lens was zoomed. Subjects’ reports about their experience
indicate that initially they are only aware of the tactile stimulus/tactile experience. Then, after practice, they report experi-
encing stable objects out in the world in front of them, not the tactile stimulus/experience (although they can pay attention
to the tactile stimulation if they want and have the tactile experience). Thus, it is said that subjects report their experience in
quasi-visual terms. (Bach-y-Rita, 1972, and Guarniero, 1974).
One question to ask about the nature of the subjects’ mental lives after they have practiced using the device is whether
they come to have a new sensory experience. When subjects report a quasi-visual experience are they reporting some new
kind of experience—visual or tactile or otherwise—or are they merely reporting new (often accurate) judgments that they
can now make about the world based on ordinary tactile experiences caused by the pins? This question is, noticeably, rather
similar to the one that we are asking with respect to those people with type 2 blindsight: are subjects having a perceptual
experience or are they just making judgments? I will brieﬂy review the evidence in the case of sensory substitution.
A distinctive new quasi-visual experience is reported in many instances of sensory substitution.25 Sensory substitution
subjects more readily and consistently attest to a new experience than do people with type 2 blindsight. But how reliable
are these reports? There is, unfortunately no objective test to see if someone is reporting accurately. Moreover, there is reason
to think that reports about perceptual experience are sometimes not reliable. Consider the fact that there is disagreement even
in ordinary cases of perception as to the nature of experience. For example, there have been centuries of philosophical disagree-
ment about whether visual experience is two-dimensional or three-dimensional. Another contemporary example is the debate
about how rich perceptual experience is—that is in how much detail does it represents the world.26 Returning to the case of
sensory substitution, the reports about experiences when using sensory substitution vary quite dramatically. Some people
report vivid colour experiences, some report two-dimensional experience and some three-dimensional experience. Other peo-
ple don’t obviously report experience at all. On the one hand, this might lead one to doubt that we can trust such reports. How-
ever, on the other hand, the disagreement may occur because the experiences or conscious states had by different subjects are
actually different. This would be explained by the fact that different sorts of subjects have trained on sensory substitution
devices: sighted, late blind, early blind, and congenitally blind people. Moreover, subjects have undergone different training
regimes, most noticeably in the length of the training and in the degree of immersion in everyday life of the use of the device.
In addition, the motivation of subjects has been markedly different. Some subjects greatly enjoy the use of the device and want
to use it. Others do not like it and do not want to use it. There may be other differences, perhaps innate ones, between different
subjects. This might mean that some subjects have new perceptual experiences and some do not. In any case, it is clear that we
can’t take introspective reports as straightforward evidence in favour of the existence of new perceptual experiences.
As with the case of type 2 blindsight, one cannot look to brain imaging to establish whether people using TVSS are having
new perceptual experiences. This is because we would have to be conﬁdent that any correlations that had been noted
between brain activity and perceptual experience were reﬂective of all instances of perceptual experience. However, cases
such as sensory substitution and type 2 blindsight precisely question that. In the case of sensory substitution in particular,
there has been much speculation that practice with the substitution device might change the functional role of different
parts of the brain, rendering prior apparent correlations otiose.
Besides subjective reports and brain imaging, other evidence has been cited in favour of the proposition that those using
TVSS devices are having perceptual experience. One piece of evidence is the ‘‘looming’’ response displayed by subjects.
When, unbeknown to subjects, experimenters zoomed the camera lens, subjects displayed the reﬂex action of backing away
from something looming towards them. It is claimed that displaying this fast and automatic response attests to fast and
automatic processing of the signal, which it is further claimed, is a sign of perceptual processing. Hence, it is argued, subjects24 Developed by Paul Bach-y-Rita (initially with Carter Collins). See Bach-y-Rita (1972). I focus on this case for ease of exposition, but the same points could be
made about audio-visual sensory substitution, as exempliﬁed by use of the vOICe, developed by Peter Meijer (1992).
25 The most persuasive reports are given in Ward and Meijer (2010) with respect to audio-visual sensory substitution.
26 See Noë (2002).
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jects having quasi-visual experiences; however, an opponent could argue that there could be fast and automatic inferences
being made. Perhaps subjects can make fast and automatic inferences in light of their training that ordinary subjects cannot,
and hence do not have quasi-visual experiences—they just have a thought that something is looming towards them. In addi-
tion, an opponent could point out that often recognition of objects by subjects using TVSS takes a relatively long time, effort,
and attention. For example, a good object recognition performance might consist in a subject identifying an object in ten or
more seconds. This is clearly unlike ordinary vision.
Another piece of evidence about whether subjects are having a visual experience that should be considered is the fact that
blind people report forming new perceptual concepts such as parallax, shadows and interposition of objects after training
with TVSS. Someone might try to argue that, as the blind didn’t form these concepts before, it must be that they can do
so now because they are having a new perceptual experience. However, one might think that the blind form these new con-
cepts on account of inferences and judgments that they learn to make on the basis of tactile experiences. So while this evi-
dence may also prima facie tell in favour of the idea that subjects are having quasi-visual experiences, it is not conclusive.
Finally, one can re-create persisting illusory visual effects using TVSS devices. One can create the Muller-Lyer illusion and
the waterfall illusion in subjects using TVSS. Moreover, one can re-create these illusions when the subject knows the effect is
illusory. This is often taken to be a key sign of perceptual experience—that it can persist in the face of conclusive counter-
evidence—while belief should disappear. However, one can imagine a thought, judgment or belief that it seems as if the
world is a certain way persisting in a subject when the subject knows that it is not that way. Thinking, judging or believing
that things seem a certain way is compatible with knowledge that the world is not that way. Thus, one could think that sub-
jects had such thoughts, judgments or beliefs, rather than quasi-visual experiences. So again, while suggestive, this evidence
is inconclusive.
In summary, showing that subjects do have a new perceptual experience, rather than making fast automatic inferences is
a real challenge. At the moment, we don’t have a clear answer; however, in my opinion, the weight of the evidence points
towards the conclusion that, at least in some cases, subjects have a new quasi-visual experience.
Although I have by no means shown it to be true, let us suppose that some subjects do have a new quasi-visual experi-
ence. It is worth doing this to reﬂect on what the nature of that experience would be. Do such experiences represent colour?
It is tempting to think that colour—including black, white and grey—is not represented: for subjects only receive pressure
stimuli, not chromatic or light stimuli. And even though the pressure stimuli are driven by a camera detecting light and pro-
ducing black and white images, subjects need not know whether pressure corresponds to blackness or whether it corre-
sponds to whiteness. So how would they, or their brains, know which colour to assign to an object? In particular, it is
tempting to think that a congenitally blind person would not have experiences of colour. One might think that a non-con-
genitally blind person, or their brain, generates experiences of colour on account of previous chromatic experiences and
knowledge of colour that they have. They might assign black or white colours to objects drawing on their colour knowledge
or, simply, arbitrarily. Or they might assign chromatic colour. For example, if a subject saw a banana shape, their memory of
previous yellow bananas might render the banana that they experience yellow. Ward and Meijer (2010) provide evidence
that this does happen in some cases of sensory substitution. However, as congenitally blind people have never experienced
colour, this method of colour entering quasi-visual experience cannot be what happens in them. Suppose therefore that con-
genitally blind people don’t experience colour when using TVSS. Could they be having quasi-visual experiences—quasi-visual
because they are experiences of form at a distance from the body—that don’t involve experiencing colour? To assess this fur-
ther let’s think about bat echo-location.
One way that bats perceive without using their eyes is to send out a high frequency ‘chirrup’ and listen for the returning
echo. Using this sense, bats can detect 3-D objects at a distance from their body. Doing this allows them to negotiate through
their environment in the dark, quickly dodging obstacles such as tree trunks and branches, and skillfully catching moths.
Clearly bats don’t detect colour—for they are not making use of wavelengths of light—but they do detect form.
In virtue of what property do bats experience form? Perhaps bats experience distal form by experiencing sound-reﬂec-
tance properties. After all, they are detecting form using sound-reﬂectance properties. If this were the case, then the expe-
rience of colour is not necessary in order to experience distal form.
But in experiencing distal form does one need to experience some other quality or other? Or could one have a ‘‘pure’’
experience of distal form alone—without experiencing any other quality? If one must experience distal form by experiencing
some quality or other, what quality do congenitally blind people using the TVSS experience? One might suppose that they
experience light reﬂectance in the form of luminance—after all it is light that is driving the camera’s responses and hence
ultimately the tactile stimulus on the congenitally blind person’s skin. However, congenitally blind people using TVSS need
not knowwhat is driving the TVSS. Indeed, we could have built a device where the pins were not driven by camera, but by an
echolocatory device. We could set things up so that a congenitally blind person would not be in a position to knowwhether it
is a light sensitive camera that is gathering the relevant information about distal form or whether is an echo-location device
that is doing so. Given this, there is reason to believe that they would not be experiencing distal form in virtue of experienc-
ing light-reﬂectance or luminance.
Another suggestion is that congenitally blind TVSS users might be experiencing distal form in virtue of experiencing
the pressure that they feel on their skin. One might think this because to some extent there is reason to say that the prox-
imal stimulus acting on the subject is pressure. (I say, ‘‘to some extent’’ because one could make a case that if light is driv-
ing the camera then that is the proximal stimulus. Whether pressure or light should be held to be the proximal stimulus is
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experiencing the pressure that they feel on their skin is because experienced users of TVSS say that they no longer have
tactile experiences of pressure, or at least not ones that they notice. But they do have experiences—and experiences that
they notice—of distal form.
To make things difﬁcult for us, however, let us suppose, that the users are experiencing both pressure and distal form.
(So let us suppose that when they report the absence of such experience they do so only because they are not attending to
that experience, not because they are not having that experience.) In one sense, one could say that the users are experi-
encing distal form in virtue of experiencing pressure because if one took away the experience of the pressure (say by tak-
ing away the pressure on their skin) then the subjects would not have the experiences of distal form. However, this is true
because the experiences of pressure cause the experiences of distal form. However, when asking whether TVSS users are
experiencing distal form in virtue of experiencing the pressure I do not have a causal reading of ‘‘in virtue of’’ in mind
here. When I say ‘‘in virtue of’’ I have a phenomenal relationship in mind. To illustrate what this is, consider the following
example. Suppose that whenever one had an experience of a red circle, that experience caused one to have an experience
of a blue square. In the phenomenal sense that I intend, one does not experience the rectangle in virtue of experiencing
the redness—even though the experience of the redness is a cause of the experience of the rectangle. One experiences the
rectangle, in the phenomenal sense, in virtue of experiencing the blueness. The form of the rectangle is experienced to be
constituted by the blueness. This is the phenomenal sense of ‘‘in virtue of’’ that I have in mind. Here are some other exam-
ples of the in virtue of relation obtaining in the phenomenal sense: one auditorily experiences the pitch of a note in virtue
of experiencing the volume of the note, one tactually experiences the roundness of a coin on the palm of one’s hand in
virtue of experiencing the pressure against of the coin against one’s skin. In all these cases where one thing is experienced
in virtue of (in the phenomenal sense) another, the two things are co-located: the blueness of the rectangle and the form
of the rectangle, the pitch of the note and the volume of the note, the roundness of the coin and the pressure of the coin.
The apparent co-location of qualities would seem to be required for one to be experienced in virtue of (in the phenom-
enological sense) another. Therefore, I don’t think that it can be true that the congenitally blind users are experiencing
distal form in virtue of experiencing pressure. The pressure that is felt is experienced as located on their skin and not
at a location in front of the body where the distal objects with their forms are experienced to be. How could the form
that is experienced to be at one location be experienced to be constituted by a quality experienced at another location?
It could not.
If light-reﬂectance, luminance and pressure are not good candidates for what a congenitally blind person would experi-
ence when they experience distal form, and if there are no other good candidate qualities, this should lead us to think that
experiences of distal form, without experience of any other quality, are possible. Of course we should remember that we
have not ruled out completely the idea that the congenitally blind are not having perceptual experiences when using the
TVSS. However, there is some reason to suppose that they are, and if we do suppose it then we have good reason to think
that, as there is no good candidate for the property in virtue of which (in the phenomenal sense) they experience distal form,
then there is no such property, and none is required. I will call such experiences experiences of ‘‘pure distal form’’. If there
can be such perceptual experiences, then showing that people with type 2 blindsight lack experiences of colour does not
entail that they lack perceptual experiences of distal form.
I turn now to consider three other cases: a special case of achromatopsia, the phantom contours created by Rogers-
Ramachandran and Ramachandran (1998), and instances of amodal completion. The ﬁrst of these cases is like the case of
sensory substitution because there are two competing accounts of the nature of the conscious state that the subject is hav-
ing, which we cannot settle deﬁnitively. The other two cases are, however, more clear-cut. All three of these cases differ from
the case of sensory substitution because, unlike it, they do not provide examples of experiences of pure distal form. What
they do provide is examples of experiences of distal form with no difference in colour—including black, white and greys—
or texture. These are interesting cases that not only lend weight to the idea that there could be cases of perceptual experi-
ences of pure distal form, they also provide us with another plausible account of the nature of the experiences of people with
type 2 blindsight.
People with achromatopsia cannot see colour. This is tested for by the Farnsworth–Munsell 100-Hue Test, in which sub-
jects are asked to place 100 patches of different hues in order (Farnsworth, 1943). Moreover achromatopsics can neither
name nor match colours. They can detect luminance, and so can perceive many distal forms in virtue of differences in lumi-
nance. This condition comes in two forms: cerebral achromatopsia (in which an area of cortex that seems necessary for the
experience of colour is lost) and retinal monochromatism (in which pigments (blue-cone monochromatism) or cell-classes
(rod monochromatism) fail to be expressed in the retina). There is no wavelength speciﬁc input to the visual system in ret-
inal monochromats. In contrast, cerebral achrmoatopsics have a normal set of wavelength selective inputs to the visual
system.
A particular subject with cerebral achromatopsia, MS, has been studied by Kentridge, Heywood, and Cowey (2004).
Despite being achromatopsic, he could detect isoluminant borders of different chromatic composition. When a shape was
placed against an isoluminant background, which differed only in chromaticity, MS, could detect it. In other words, he could
experience distal form (an edge) but not because he was detecting any changes or difference in luminance. These are very
odd results. MS is sensitive to a pure chromatic difference despite, in all other respects, being colour blind. This raises inter-
esting questions about MS’s phenomenology when detecting such edges.
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A world without background-invariant colour constancy for MS is not one of ever-changing unstable colour, it is one in
which colour is absent and meaningless. This is not to say, however, that discrimination of local contrast is unconscious.
For all but the most difﬁcult discriminations MS either deliberated at length over his decisions or made them unhesitat-
ingly. Only on very rare occasions did he need to be prompted to simply make a guess. The neural response to local chro-
matic contrast therefore produces a percept which is acted upon consciously (1994: 829).27
Suppose that we thought that because MS is achromatopsic he only sees black and white and shades of grey. This is a
common view of what achromatopisic vision is like.28 (However, this view of achromatopsic vision can be challenged as I will
discuss in more detail below.) Because the border MS can detect is deﬁned chromatically and not by luminance, we have reason
to think that there is not a luminance difference—hence that MS will not experience it as deﬁned by black, white or grey. But, at
the same time, MS is an achromat and hence cannot order, discriminate, or name colours. So it is tempting to think that the
border cannot be experienced by MS in virtue of his experiencing different chromatic colours. If MS doesn’t experience the bor-
der in virtue of differences in shades of black, white or gray, and he doesn’t experience chromatic colours, then one might think
that MS must experience distal form without experiencing any difference in colour at all—chromatic or achromatic. In other
words, one might postulate that MS experiences a uniform achromatic colour, yet some distal form within that achromatic ﬁeld.
If that is right, then the case of MS would provide us with an example of a visual experience of distal form with no difference in
experience of (chromatic or achromatic) colour. Such an experience is not an experience of pure distal form, which is an expe-
rience of distal form without any experience of colour. It is an experience of distal form whilst having an entirely uniform expe-
rience of colour.29
If this is a correct description of the experience, then this is not exactly what we are looking for: an experience of distal
form with no experience of colour. However, it would be something very close: an experience of distal form—an edge or
boundary at a distance in front of one—with no difference in experienced colour or texture forming the boundary or existing
across the experienced boundary. Nonetheless, their existence tells in favour of the idea that there could be experiences of
pure distal form without colour for these experiences show that one needn’t experience distal form in virtue (in the phenom-
enal sense) of experiencing colour boundaries. This is also a property of experiences of pure distal form.
Moreover, the existence of this kind of experience suggests a new account of the nature of the experience of those with
type 2 blindsight for moving stimuli. Recall that GY reported that his experience was like ‘‘black on black’’ like ‘‘a mouse
under a blanket’’ (Beckers & Zeki, 1995: 56, reported by Stoerig & Barth, 2001: 582). Perhaps GY experienced a uniformly
black or uniformly dark grey achromatic surface and yet experienced a moving form or a moving edge across it, in a manner
similar to the way in which we are supposing MS experiences distal form.
However, one might question this account of MS’s experience. I said above that some people question the traditional view
that achromats have experiences of the qualities of black, white and grey that humans with ordinary vision do. Akins (2014)
argues that they do not. Similarly, when it comes to people with less severe forms of colour blindness—dichromats—the tra-
ditional view is that they lack experiences of red and green, and only experience the world in shades of yellow, blue and the
greys. (See Broakes, 2010.) Broakes’ own view is that they experience many more colours than yellows, blues and greys, and
perhaps even experience all of the colours that normal observers do just not in as many sitations as those with normal colour
vision. However, contrary to the traditional view and Broakes’ view, others hold that dichromats experience none of the col-
ours that those with normal colour vision experience. (See Byrne and Hilbert (2010) for arguments for two different versions
of this view.) The reason that people have for holding that achromats and dichromats do not have any of the same sort of
colour experiences compared to those with ordinary human colour vision is that the workings of their luminance and/or
chromatic colour visual systems is so unlike that of those with ordinary human colour vision that it is reasonable to believe
that they just have very different sorts of experience of the qualities of the surfaces of objects. Let us agree to call those qual-
ities—chromatic or achromatic—‘‘alien colours’’, as Byrne and Hilbert do.30
If it is right to think that those with different luminance and chromatic visual systems, compared to those of normal
humans, experience alien colours (both chromatic and nonchromatic alien colours), then we should think that MS
experiences alien colours. If that is right, then it opens up an account of his experience that is different to that considered
above. Perhaps MS experiences patches of what those with normal human colour vision would experience as being different27 It is interesting to note that Kentridge et al. think that this study contributes to the debate about what neural activity is necessary for consciousness, as we
have seen, in a different way, that the blindsight studies above do. Concerning the response of MS to the chromatic boundaries they state: ‘‘The most likely
source of this neural response is in double-opponent cells in V1; certainly much of the later (so-called higher-order) parts of the visual system for colour are
destroyed in MS. The implication is that activity in V1 in this experiment correlates with a conscious experience, a conclusion at odds with Crick and Koch
(1998) hypothesis that only activity in areas making direct projections to frontal lobes may correlate with conscious experience. In MS the route is most likely
to be indirect, for example from V1 to dorsal parietal cortex and only then onwards to prefrontal cortex’’ (2004: 829).
28 See Akins (2014) who cites Nordby (1996), a vision scientist studying achromats who have only rod vision, and who himself has only rod vision (and thus is
a retinal achromat). Nordby describes his visual phenomenology as consisting of black, white and shades of grey. As I go on to say, it is not clear whether this
suggestion about the phenomenology of retinal achromats is correct. There is the further issue that what is true of the phenomenology of retinal achromats is
not necessarily true of the phenomenology of cerebral achromats.
29 It is worth noting that MS struggles to describe whether or in what respect the ﬁgure looks different from the ground (Kentridge, personal communication).
30 In Macpherson (2003) I discuss colours that people do not normally see, experiences of which can be created in normal people with suitable stimuli and
equipment in the psychology lab, ’’novel colours’’.
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discriminate, or order what those with normal human vision would call different colours, in the way that normal humans do,
because his visual system cannot in general pull apart luminance from chromaticity in the way that the visual systems of
people with normal human vision can. If this interpretation of MS is correct then, in one sense, MS is experiencing distal form
without colour—ordinary non-alien colour—but, in another sense, he is experiencing distal form with colour—alien colour.
Whichever way one thinks it is best to describe the case, it would not be a case of experience of distal form without a dif-
ference in some quality or other.31
Deciding between these two hypothesis—that MS experiences boundaries but not in virtue of differences in colour or that
MS experiences different in alien colours that deﬁne the boundaries—is very difﬁcult. Recall that MS can accurately detect a
shape on a background that has the same isoluminance, and that differs only chromatically. However, in addition, given
three such shapes on such a background, one of which has a different colour but the same luminance from the others, he
can tell the odd one out. One might think that this means that MS must experience a difference in the surface qualities of
the different shapes, and therefore that the alien colour hypothesis must be true. However, there is an alternative explana-
tion. It could be that the boundaries between the shapes and their backgrounds are more or less distinct in the different chro-
matic cases and so the boundaries appear different to MS in some respects, and that it is this boundary information, rather
than difference in surface appearance, that MS is relying on to tell the odd one out.
A striking ﬁnding is that this ability to tell the chromatic odd one out is thwarted when the shapes are surrounded by a
thick black border so that there is no direct contiguity between the colour of the shapes that have to be discriminated and
their background (because the background and the shapes are each contiguous to the black border). This might tempt one
into thinking that MS cannot be experiencing the shapes as having different alien colours. For, if he was, why would this
difference in alien colour not persist in the face of the addition of the black boundaries, and allow him to do the task?
However, this fact is not decisive. When MS had to pick out the odd one out among three shapes against a uniform ach-
romatic background, all of which had the same chromaticity (they were gray on a gray background), where one of the shapes
varied in luminance from the other two shapes, he could, as one would expect, do so. However, when the shapes were sur-
rounded by a black border he could not do the task. This is rather surprising. If one followed the logic of the reasoning in the
above paragraph then one would be forced to say that MS doesn’t experience differences in luminance either. If this is right,
then perhaps MS only experiences edges and no surface qualities at all—neither chromatic or achromatic! Whether that tal-
lies with his ability to discriminate luminance on other occasions is unclear. It certainly seems as if MS has difﬁculties com-
paring luminance and chromatic values between two areas that are not contiguous. This is compatible with him
experiencing alien colours, yet only being able to compare and contrast them when particular boundary conditions obtain.
Therefore, it is hard to know how to interpret the results of the experiments where there was the addition of the black border
in the chromatic case.
Finally, Kentridge et al. (2004) point out that the Farnsworth–Munsell 100-Hue Test consists of colours embedded in, and
surrounded by, black casings which resemble the black borders used in their experiments described above. Given that the
above experiments show that the addition of black borders impedes discovery of the chromatic differences that MS can
detect, further experimentation on MS would be desirable using methods that employ sorting tasks where the colours
can be compared in conditions where their borders are contiguous. For all we know, MS might consistently sort the colours
consistently and in line with some alien colour scheme in those conditions.
To summarise the discussion of MS, I have argued that there is one interpretation of MS according to which he has expe-
riences of distal form without any difference in colour (chromatic, achromatic or alien), and another according to which he
does not—he has experiences of form in virtue of alien colours. And the former interpretation has two subvarients. One of
these is that MS can experience distal form while perceiving uniform achromatic colour. The other is that MS can experience
distal form while perceive no chromatic or achromatic colour at all. Deciding between these accounts is in my opinion
impossible at present. It would be interesting to try to probe the nature of MS’s phenomenal character in more detail.
One could ask him to compare a chromatic isoluminant boundary to an achromatic non-isoluminant one. One could also
describe the two different accounts of his visual experience proposed here to him and ask him which, if any, he would be
prepared to endorse. And then one could ask him to compare his experience of a chromatic isoluminant boundary to that
of the ‘‘phantom contour’’ experiences and experiences of amodal complation described below. Nevertheless, at present,
one cannot conclusively say that MS provides us with an example of experience of distal form perception without a differ-
ence in colour, but some plausible accounts of him do.
I turn now to consider two other cases: the phantom contours created by Rogers-Ramachandran and Ramachandran
(1998), and instances of amodal completion. Unlike the cases of MS and sensory substitution where there were two different
accounts of the nature of the conscious state being had which we could not decide between, these cases are ones where we
can establish that subjects are having perceptual experiences and what their nature is. Neither case is a case of an experience
of pure distal form. But they are examples of experiences of distal form with no difference in colour—including black, white
and greys—or texture.31 Mandik (2014) argues against the proposition that necessarily, visual experiences represent colour. He considers MS and thinks that his vision is an
example that shows it to be false, however he does not distinguish the two different interpretations of MS that I have done in the main text.
Fig. 1. The kind of stimulus used by Rogers-Ramachandran and Ramachandran (1998).
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one side of the background were white dots. On the other side were black dots, as shown in Fig. 1. The dots ﬂickered in
counterphase, so that when the white dots changed to black, simultaneously the black dots changed to white. When the fre-
quency of the changes of the colour of the spots was low (less than 7 Hz), subjects could tell that the spots on one half of the
stimulus were in counterphase with those on the other half. And, unsurprisingly, they could indicate where the boundary
was between the out of phase spots. However, when the frequency of the ﬂicker of the spots increased to 15 Hz subjects
were no longer able to tell that the spots were ﬂickering in counterphase. Thus, phenomenally one would think that the stim-
ulus would have looked to them to be uniform. However, subjects experienced a ‘‘phantom contour’’ where the border was
between the spots that were ﬂickering in counterphase. Subjects could also experience movement of the phantom boundary
when the stimulus was changed so that which spots were in counterphase was altered. Rogers-Ramachandran and
Ramachandran state, ‘‘We were quite surprised, therefore, to observe a distinctly visible horizontal border separating the
two ﬁelds, i.e., one sees a texture border deﬁned by indistinguishable elements. We call this paradoxical percept a phantom
contour’’ (1998: 71). If the spots in question were red and green, rather than black and white, the boundary could be detected
in similar conditions, so long as the spots were not isoluminant. The spots had to have different luminance values in order for
the effect to occur.
Rogers-Ramachandran and Ramachandran claim:
Taken collectively, these ﬁndings indicate two different systems exist in human vision. One of these is a fast
contour-extracting system that can signal contours but not their polarity and the other is a slow system that signals
surface qualities. The contour system signals the presence of a border but cannot tell which side of the border is black
and which side is white. That is, it can detect that there is a difference between the two sides and also follow high
ﬂicker rates, but it cannot signal the direction or the ‘‘sign’’ of the difference. The surface system, on the other hand,
can potentially signal the surface characteristics (color and luminance) but at 15 Hz, the speed of ﬂicker is too high for
it to follow. Thus, the phantom contour stimulus seems to isolate or selectively activate the fast boundary extracting
system. So what is perceived is the output of the contour system alone, a contour deﬁned by two surfaces which look
identical. (1998: 74).32
If Rogers-Ramachandran and Ramachandran’s report is correct then not only does the brain register that there is a bound-
ary without registering which properties lie on either side of it, this information is also reﬂected in the nature of the expe-
rience had when looking at the stimulus. One experiences a uniform surface (albeit it one with apparently uniformly
ﬂickering dots on it) yet one experiences some boundary. Rogers-Ramachandran and Ramachandran say the border is expe-
rienced in virtue of ‘‘indistinguishable elements’’ (1998: 71) that ‘‘look identical’’ (1998: 74). Given that, it would be arbitrary
which side of the boundary was signaled to be light and which dark, and given that the brain cannot discriminate the ﬂick-
ering dots, there is good reason to think that their description of the experience is correct.32 They go on to discuss whether these two pathways correspond to the magnocellular and parvocellular pathways.
Fig. 2. A Kanizsa Triangle.
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form with no difference in experienced colour or texture forming the boundary or existing across the boundary. As men-
tioned previously, such cases lend weight to the supposition that there could be experiences of pure distal form without col-
our, for in these experiences it is not in virtue of experiencing colour boundaries that one experiences form. Thus they lend
weight to the supposition that colour is not a structural feature of experience. In turn this backs up the idea that showing
that people with type 2 blindsight lack experiences of colour does not show that they lack visual experience.
Moreover, as also mentioned previously, the existence of this kind of experience suggests that one account of the expe-
riences of those with type 2 blindsight could be accurate: that they experience a uniformly black or dark grey background
and yet form and movement within. This case of phantom contours provides evidence not just of form, as the case of MS
does, but of movement perception in such conditions. This is because Rogers-Ramachandran and Ramachandran altered
the location of the phantom contour by altering the proportion of black to white dots. Subjects reported experiencing the
phantom contour moving across their visual ﬁeld.
Finally, I turn to consider a last case: amodal completion. In order to explain this example, I will ﬁrst explain what modal
completion is. Consider the Kanizsa triangle in Fig. 2.33 Ordinary perceivers report experiencing a bright white equilateral tri-
angle pointing towards the top of the page that is lighter than the background, and is hence deﬁned by lightness boundaries
within experience. That triangle is experienced as partially occluding another triangle pointing towards the bottom of the page
that is deﬁned by black lines. Three ‘‘pacman-like’’ ﬁgures are also experienced as occluded circles. On close inspection of the
ﬁgure, one can come to realise that part of this experience is illusory. There are no lightness boundaries forming a triangle point-
ing towards the top of the page. What is important to notice, for our purposes, is that when one experiences that illusory tri-
angle, one has an experience as of edges created by a luminance boundary. We know that there are no such luminance edges
and there is not a difference in lightness where there appears to be one; but that is what we experience. Cases such as this are
cases of modal completion because although the edges that seem to form the upward pointing triangle do not exist, one has a
visual experience that represents such edges in a way that typical visual experiences do: in virtue of a colour, lightness or tex-
ture boundary. With the nature of this case of modal completion ﬁrmly in mind, consider now a case of amodal completion.
Consider Fig. 3. When asked, people say that they have a strong sense that it consists in a square that continues behind an
occluding circle—hence, that it seems as if the shapes in Fig. 4 are present. However, Fig. 3 is perfectly compatible with the
shapes shown in either Fig. 5 or Fig. 6 being present—and hence with a square with a corner removed or with a square with a
jaggy protruding extension to a corner being present—as well as with a square being present (Michott et al., 1964/1991). The
visual experience of Fig. 3, however, does not consist in experienced boundaries consisting of colour, lightness or texture
corresponding the occluded portion of the square. Yet, nonetheless, it is a square that is reported as being present. This is
a case of amodal completion, and it contrasts with modal completion in that it occurs when part of an object is experienced
as occluded and is reported as having one of many possible shapes, yet the occluded portion of the object is not experienced
as being deﬁned by colour, lightness or texture boundaries.
There are two different interpretations of amodal completion. One is that such visual experiences are only of the lines that
make up Fig. 3 on the uniform background and that the shape of the occluded ﬁgure is inferred, yielding a judgment, thought
or belief that an occluded square is present. The second interpretation is that the visual experience is of the lines that make
up Fig. 3 on the uniform background and, in addition, the occluded part of the square is represented in the visual experience.
A great deal of psychological research has gone into determining which interpretation is correct. Michotte, Thines, and
Crabbe (1964/1991) themselves noted that amodal completion occurs despite subjects’ beliefs—indeed knowledge—that
the occluded ﬁgure is not the way that their experience tells them it is. For example, if one ﬁrst sees that a square with a
protruding jaggy corner, as shown in Fig. 6, is present and then it is occluded by a circle, then what is seen will still be expe-
rienced as an occluded square, not an occluded square with a protruding jaggy corner. Moreover, that experience persists33 Discovery of the phenomenon is often attributed to Schumann (1900). However, interest in modern times was roused by Kanizsa (1955, 1976).
Fig. 3. An illustration of amodal completion.
Fig. 4. A square and a circle.
Fig. 5. A square with a corner removed and a circle.
Fig. 6. A square with a jaggy protruding extension to one corner and a circle.
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Fig. 8. A pencil occluding a ﬁgure known to be a broken triangle yields an amodal experience of a complete triangle.
Fig. 7. Amodal completion of the central ﬁgure yields an experience as of an occluded square, despite the fact that one experiences multiple jaggy
protruding cornered squares being about that are a possible candidates for the nature of the occluded central ﬁgure.
124 F. Macpherson / Consciousness and Cognition 32 (2015) 104–128even if a lot of jaggy protruding cornered squares are experienced. Looking at Fig. 7 should be illustrative. Likewise, if one
draws a broken triangle as in the left-hand side of Fig. 8 and then places a pencil over it in the manner depicted in the
right-hand side of Fig. 8 then one experiences a completed occluded triangle even when one knows it not to be such.
Using a visual search paradigm, studies have shown conclusively that amodal completion can occur without focused
attention and within the time span associated with early visual processing (Enns & Rensink, 1998). And, in a study directly
measuring cells’ response in nonhuman primates, neurophysiological data show that ‘‘cells as early as V1 have the compu-
tational power to make inferences about the nature of partially invisible forms seen behind occluding structures’’ (Sugita,
1999). These results and others are summarised in Wagemans, Lier and Scholl (2006) and strongly suggest that the occluded
parts of objects are experienced visually—and are not inferred.
Further evidence of the genuinely experiential nature of amodal occlusion phenomena is given by Briscoe (2011).
Consider Fig. 9 that is typically experienced as a number of unconnected two-dimensional forms that lie on the same
two-dimensional plane of depth. When these elements appear to be occluded by the insertion of oblongs into the picture,
as in Fig. 10, the forms previously seen are no longer experienced as two-dimensional, unconnected, and on the same
two-dimensional plane of depth. They are experienced as connected, three-dimensional pieces that form a three-dimen-
sional cube. This change in one’s conscious experience provides as clear a demonstration as one could hope for that changes
in one’s experience, rather than thought or propositional attitudes, are brought about by amodal completion.
If this is right, then in amodal completion we visually experience occluded distal form at a distance from our bodies but
not in virtue of experiencing an edge, border or form that is experienced in virtue of colour, lightness or texture. Such expe-
riences are therefore very similar to the experiences of phantom contours that I discussed above. Again, these experiences
are not ones of pure distal form without colour, but experiences of distal form without an experience of a difference in col-
our, lightness or texture. Nevertheless, as in the case of MS and the phantom contours, the existence of these experiences
lend weight to the idea that there could be pure distal experiences of form. This is because, in these experiences, form is
experienced but not in virtue of differences in colour, lightness or texture. Moreover, they may themselves be the sorts of
experience that those with type 2 blindsight have.
It would be interesting, and potentially informative, to ask people to compare and contrast the phenomenal character of
their experiences of amodal completion with their experiences of phantom contours. Similarly, it would be interesting to get
MS to compare his experience of form deﬁned by differently coloured but equiluminous areas with his experiences of these
other phenomena.
Fig. 9. The elements look to be unconnected two-dimensional forms that lie on the same plane of depth.
Fig. 10. When the elements of Fig. 9 are interspersed with oblongs, the oblongs are experienced as occluders of a three-dimensional cube.
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perceptual experiences, then the best account of the experience of a trained congenitally blind person who was using such
a device is that they have a perceptual experience of pure distal form without colour. The case of MS has two interpretations.
On one he has a perceptual experience of distal form in virtue of alien colours. On another he experiences distal formwithout
experience a difference in colour (chromatic, achromatic, or alien). I have also argued that the case of phantom contours and
amodal completion show that there can be experiences of distal form without any differences in colour, lightness or texture.
The existence of these experiences lends weight to the suggestion that there could be perceptual experiences of pure distal
form with no experience of colour (including luminance) or alien colour. Moreover, they suggest another description of the
perceptual experiences of those with type 2 blindsight for moving stimuli: experiences of form and/or movement within a
ﬁeld of uniform colour, lightness and texture.
We therefore have two plausible candidates for the nature of the perceptual experiences of those with type 2 blindsight:
experiences of pure distal form and experiences of distal form without experience of difference in colour, lightness, or tex-
ture (but not a complete lack of colour, lightness or texture). Recall that Brogaard (2011, 2012) held that there cannot be
visual experiences of pure distal form and hence that we should reject the idea that those with type 2 blindsight are having
perceptual experiences. She holds that we should think that they are having thoughts instead. I have argued that there is no
good reason to maintain that people with type 2 blindsight cannot be having perceptual experiences.
Are such perceptual experiences visual experiences? One can imagine someone claiming a priori that for an experience to
be visual it must be an experience of colour. But I think that such a view would merely be stipulative: a linguistic decision
taken on no good grounds. What reason could one have to hold this view, rather than the view that experience of distal form
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that these experiences are caused by light, which is the proximal stimulus of vision and caused by the use of the eye, which is
the sensory organ of vision. And to the extent that these are relevant, they point towards the experience being visual. How-
ever, as I have already argued above, the modality of an experience is not completely determined by facts such as these, as
the case of synaesthetic concurrent experiences show. What is represented by the experience—distal form—is that which is
represented by only visual experiences among the human senses, and plausibly the phenomenal character of the experience
is most like visual experiences. But are those things enough to make the experience visual? I do not think that there is any
fact of the matter here. I do not have space to argue it here, but as I have argued in Macpherson (2011a), not only may the
distinctions between the sensory modalities be a matter of degree, the distinctions between kinds of experience may be too.
Whether or not one withholds the epithet of ‘‘visual’’ from such experiences, they are perceptual experiences and, of all
kinds of human experience, most like visual experiences—due to the fact that they are experiences of distal form, and caused
by light stimulating the eyes. Showing that there is no good reason to rule out that those with type 2 blindsight have per-
ceptual experiences is the crux of the matter in this paper, not whether they should be classed as visual perceptual experi-
ences or perceptual experiences in some other modality. Thus we can resist the idea that we are forced to conclude that
those with type 2 blindsight are only having thoughts about movement or distal form, for resisting depends on showing that
they could be having perceptual experiences, not visual experiences per se.
6. Conclusion
In section four, we saw that people have argued about the nature of the conscious state that is had by people with type 2
blindsight. I argued that the experimental evidence available at present does not settle the matter. I then discussed the argu-
ment put forward by Overgaard and Grünbaum (2011) for the conclusion that people with type 2 blindsight must be having
visual experiences and argued that it was not sound. This was because it relies on the false premise that the conscious state
must be a visual experience because it was caused by a visual stimulus, a visual sensory organ, and early visual processing.
This is false because thoughts, beliefs, and perceptual experiences in non-visual modalities, can also have those causes. I then
examined the argument given by Brogaard (2011, 2012) for the conclusion that those with type 2 blindsight are having
thoughts based on their guessing what is before them. I argued that we lack good evidence that guessing is required to pro-
duce the conscious state that people with type 2 blindsight report, and even if it were, that is not enough to show that those
people are not having visual experiences. That is because the guessing might cause the occurrence of those visual experi-
ences—perhaps by focusing attention or by some other means. Finally, I turned to address Brogaard’s second argument to
the conclusion that those with type 2 blindsight were having thoughts and not visual experiences.
Brogaard’s second argument supposed that those who were experiencing type 2 blindsight could not be having visual
experiences because they experienced pure distal form, that is form without colour (which I stipulated to include black,
white and grey). I showed that there is a long intellectual tradition of supposing that visual experiences must represent col-
our in order to be visual. I noted that colour was one alleged structural feature of visual experience. I also argued in section
two, that it is very difﬁcult to establish the existence of any given alleged structural feature of experience and that, just
because one has not had an experience that lacks an alleged structural feature, that is not reason enough to establish that
the alleged structural feature is indeed one. The example of experiences of novel colours was illustrative.
I set out, in section ﬁve, to examine the evidence concerning whether there could be visual experiences in the absence of
experience of colour by looking to see if there were any experiences of pure distal form. I argued that there is some, although
not conclusive, reason to think that perceptual experiences of the congenitally blind using TVSS might be of this ilk. I also
showed that one plausible interpretation of the nature of the experiences of the achromat MS, when he looks at a form delin-
eated by two equiluminant areas that are different in chromatic colour, is that they are of pure distal form. However, there
was another interpretation of the nature of the experience of MS that was at least as plausible, and that did not have this
consequence. I suggested that further investigation of MS would be instructive, in particular, asking him to compare his
experiences of chromatic boundaries with no luminance difference with his experience of phantom contours and amodal
completion.
I then showed that the evidence concerning phantom boundaries and amodal completion clearly shows that there could
be perceptual experiences of distal form and movement with no difference in colour, lightness or texture differences. And I
argued that the existence of such experiences was evidence in favour of thinking that there can be experiences of pure distal
form with no colour, lightness or texture. This is because, in such experiences, form and movement are not experienced in
virtue of experiencing colour, lightness or texture boundaries. Moreover, I showed that experience of form and movement, or
just movement, with no difference in colour, lightness or texture, was a second very good candidate for being the sort of
experience that people with type 2 blindsight are having, based on their reports of experiencing darkness and black shadows
(in addition to the experiences already considered or of pure distal form and/or movement). If I am right and such experi-
ences are possible, then, contra Brogaard, there is no good reason to doubt that the reports of people with type 2 blindsight
could be accurate descriptions of perceptual experiences. Thus, Brogaard’s reason for holding that those with type 2 blind-
sight are not having visual experiences should be rejected.
I discussed whether experiences of pure distal form and experiences of distal form with no difference in colour or texture
should be thought of as visual. I said that they are more like ordinary visual experiences than experiences in any other
F. Macpherson / Consciousness and Cognition 32 (2015) 104–128 127modality. Moreover, I claimed that there is no good reason to deny that such experiences are visual. Denying it would merely
be a stipulative manoeuvre. In any case, what is important is whether there is any good reason to deny that the conscious
states of those with type 2 blindsight are perceptual experiences, and I have argued that there is not. The matter was only
originally discussed in terms of visual experiences as that modality seemed the most likely one for the experiences to belong
to.
Removing Brogaard’s reasons for denying that people with type 2 blindsight are having perceptual experiences does not
establish that they are doing so. However, it leaves open the possibility that they are. Further investigation of the phenom-
enon is clearly called for. In light of the arguments given in this paper, I suggest that it would be good to give those with type
2 blindsight experiences of phantom contours and amodal completion in their non-blind visual ﬁelds, and ask them to com-
pare those experiences to the conscious states that they report when their blind ﬁeld is stimulated, and to see if they are
willing to accept that there is a phenomenal match—that those experiences are the same subjectively.
In conclusion, I have taken steps forward in the investigation of three alleged structural facts about experience:
(i) the necessary experience of colour in visual experience
(ii) the necessary experience of colour in experience of distal form and movement, and
(iii) the necessary experience of difference in colour in experience of distal form and movement.
I have provided evidence against each being true. Even if some of these steps turn out to be small steps forward, that any
steps have been taken makes them signiﬁcant ones, given the difﬁculties that attend establishing or dismissing the structural
features of experience.Acknowledgment
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